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Abstract 
In our study, the selected financial liberalization and pre-crisis indicators which is inspired by the 
work of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart known as KLR approach is analyzed. For Turkish economy, 
the completion of the financial liberalization process in the time interval after 1989, the effects of shock, 
causality relationship and interact with each of these indicators is surveyed through the VAR model 
and Toda-Yamamoto test. The purpose of this study to show that financial liberalization indicators of 
hot money movements, real interest rates and credit growth triggered the crisis which were 
experienced in Turkey after 1989 by adversely effecting the pre-crisis indicators. In addition to this 
purpose, the most effective indicators of financial liberalization on pre-crisis indicators will be 
determined for Turkish economy. According to VAR model and Toda-Yamamoto causality test, the 
negative impact on the pre-crisis indicators, description of these indicators percentage and the 
causality relationship of hot money movements and real interest rates are more than the credit growth. 
The results will give ideas on policy makers in Turkey about the effectiveness of the financial 
liberalization in economic crises. 
Keywords  
financial liberalization, pre-crises indicators, KLR approach, VAR model, Toda-Yamamoto causality 
test 
 
1. Introduction 
The financial liberalization is one of the important stages of globalization movements in 1980s. This 
concept is the result of abolition of restrictions on movement of capital and the other restrictions in 
financial sector. From this point of view, it would not be wrong to state that financial liberalization 
affects the economies of countries in two ways. The first one is the “increasing foreign capital impact”, 
with the abolition of restrictions on the movement of capital. The second one is the “increasing credit 
volume impact” by enabling freedom to excess to the banking sector with the abolition or reduction of 
restrictions on the banking sector and interest rates. 
The theoretical essentials of the concept of financial liberalization have been founded in the beginning 
of 1970s by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) as a reaction to the intervention of State to the 
economy (Tuncay & Yılmaz, 2012). According to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) the problem in 
world economies and specifically in the developing countries is, the insufficient savings and the 
implemented financial pressure policies. Together with the financial pressure, the caps put on the 
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interest rates prevent the banking sector to take risks and cause the banks to direct their credits to low 
income projects (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). 
In economic literature; there are some criticisms of the ideas of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). 
According to structuralist economist Taylor (1998) if the funds that are transferred to the banking 
sector are from informal markets, the banks will have difficulty in holding the reserves so the credit 
volume will shrink. In this case, the savings will decrease and there will be an economic slowdown. On 
the other hand, according to Post Keynesian Minsky (1992), increasing capital collection with the 
financial liberalization is a fundamental problem (Tokucu, 2012). In the light of these ideas, the 
financial liberalization is mostly criticized by examining the movement of capital, the real interest rates 
and the credit volume items.  
In the Turkish economy, together with the Stabilization Program, the financial liberalization policies 
have been put in effect and applied for the realization of 24th January 1980 dated Stand by Arrangement 
which includes major reforms (Güloğlu & Altunoğlu, 2002). 
Following the abolition of restrictions on foreign capital in 1989, the crisis in Turkish economy 
increased and the Turkish economy became more vulnerable to the instabilities of the foreign world. 
The first example of this effect occurred in 1994 year crisis. Following the crisis occurred in 1998, 
November 2000 and February 2001. Turkey also affected from the crisis of 2008, which was a global 
economic crisis. These crises all have a common feature that, they all occurred in the exiting level of 
hot money movement which have high risk and a speculative character arising from the financial 
liberalization (Karluk, 2014). 
In this study we will explore the effects of financial liberalization on pre-crisis indicators of the crisis in 
Turkish economy rather than the reasons of economic crisis that occurred after the completion of the 
financial liberalization. As emphasized by some researches—such as Kaminsky’s et al. (1998) research 
on KLR approach—if the pre-crisis indicators have the signaling or warning feature to assess the 
economic or financial crisis before they occur, the determination of the effect of financial liberation on 
pre-crisis indicators and the determination of financial liberation on pre-crisis indicators of financial 
and economic crisis in Turkey would be significant and meaningful. The determination of the effect of 
financial liberation on pre-crisis indicators will provide hints to the policy makers in management of 
the Turkish economic crisis. For this purpose, after mentioning the empirical literature about financial 
liberalization and pre-crisis indicators, the data set and method is provided. And then, econometric 
findings are reported.  
 
2. The Emprical Studies on Finacial Liberalization and the Pre-Crisis Indicators in Related 
Literature 
Among the empirical studies on financial liberalization implementations in Turkish economy, Kaya 
and Yılmaz (2005), by using the monthly data of years of between 1990 and 2002, revealed that the 
financial liberation money crisis in Turkish economy has 10 percent level importance in Granger cause. 
Örnek (2006) also has determined that, the short term capital entries have a positive effect on economic 
growth. One of the studies in which capital entries and exits are used as a financial gap indicator, Özel 
(2012) presented that the financial gap, affects the economic growth negatively. In the study performed 
by Akıncı et al. (2014) by using the 1986-2012 yearly data with VAR model, revealed that the in the 
aforementioned period, the factors that increase the vulnerability are growth, portfolio investments, 
savings rate, real interest rates, inflation rates and current account balance. 
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Among the studies on the determination of pre-crisis indicators, the most important and extensive one 
is the Kamisnky et al. (1998) approach (KLR) which is performed by using the signaling method. The 
mentioned study has been performed by using the data of years between 1975 and 1995 of fifteen 
developing and five developed countries. According to KLR study, when one of the macroeconomic 
indicators is above the threshold, it is a sign that indicates a possible financial crisis in the following 24 
months. The international reserve level, the currency rate, the export growth rate, the credit growth rate 
and inflation, the money supply and current account balance are named as important indicators of crises 
(Kaminsky et al., 1998). 
In the economic literature, there have been some studies performed on analysis of pre-crisis indicators 
focusing on Turkish economy. In most of these studies the signaling approach has been used and the 
KLR model been tested for Turkish economy. Kibritçioğlu (2004), in order to determine the pre-crisis 
indicators of money crisis, tested Turkish economy with KLR model by using the data between years 
of 1986 and 2004. In the study, he revealed that the export/import, real interest rate change, the foreign 
trade balance/GNP, short term capital entry/GNP variables are succesfull in prediciting the financial 
crises.  
In their study Altıntaş ve Öz (2007), targeting the predicition of 1994 and 2001 crises with signaling 
approach, also include industrial production index, capital exit and M2/reserves to their list of pre-crisis 
indicators. Oktar ve Dalyancı (2010), in their study performed to predict the financial crisis and present 
policy suggestions; revealed that the current account balance, international reserves and real US dollar 
exchange rate are the pre-crisis indicators.  
The empirical studies in literature researched the financial liberalization, financial span, level of 
financial development related to the operation of financial system in Turkish economy. In most of these 
studies, the research been performed on economic growth, savings and investment by using the 
time-series and Granger causality analysis. Many different methods have been used in researches. In 
order to see the effects of deterioration in macroeconomic indicators, the signaling approach has been 
used and in order to see the effects of speculative attacks the logit and probit models have been used. 
However, all these empirical research came to different conclusions on which of the macro economical 
indicators caused the economic and financial crisis. Thus, the studies on the pre-crisis indicators and 
financial liberalization would not been able to propose any clear policy suggestions to economic 
decision makers to prevent crisis. In our study, our objectives are as follows: (1) How is the impact of 
financial liberalization on pre-crisis indicators (positive or negative)? (2) Which financial liberalization 
indicators is the most effective and stable on pre-crisis indicators? (3) Are there any causality 
relationship between the financial liberalization and the pre-crisis indicators?  
 
3. The Data Set and the Method  
Inspired by the Kamisky et al. (1998) study; the pre-crisis indicators as well as financial liberalization 
indicators prepared are presented below in Table 1. The indicators and their performance in economic 
crisis been chosen by considering the number of studies performed and the meaning of them. Among 
the pre-crisis indicators, the industrial production index represents the economic growth. In the study of 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) the foreign trade deficit which is the difference between the 
import and export, is a pre-crisis indicator for the current account. 
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Table 1. The Financial Liberalization and Pre-Crisis Indicators 
The Real Sector 
Pre-crisis Indicators  
Current Account 
Pre-crisis Indicators 
Capital Account Pre-crisis 
Indicators 
The Debt Structure 
Pre-crisis Indicators 
Other Financial Variables 
Pre-crisis Indicators 
Financial Liberalization 
Indicator 
Industrial Producton 
Index (IPI) 
Current Account Balance 
(cab) 
International Reserve (irz) The Foreign Debt (fd) M2 Money Supply (m2) Hot Money Movement 
(hmm) 
 
 
The Foreign Currency 
exchange (e)  
   The Growth of Credit 
(dbc) 
 The Foregin Trade 
Deficit (open) 
   Real Interest Rate (rir) 
 
According to Williamson and Mahar (2002), the abolition of the restrictions on the credit and the 
freedom of international capital movement are among the elements of financial liberalization. 
According to Siva (2002); the movement of capital as the indicators financial liberalization and M2 
money supply as a sign of financial progress should be discussed as the fundemantal macroeconomic 
variables. In addition, the credit growth which is presented in Kaminsky’s study is also remarkable as 
an indicator of financial liberalization.  
Further to these approaches, according to Boratav (2001); in the literature of financial crisis and 
financial liberalization the mostly accepted approach is that the interaction between these two-sourced 
by the movement of capital and the important part of moving capital; the short term capital movement 
named as hot money-increase the vulnerability in economy. 
In our study as an indicator of financial liberalization representing capital movement, hot money flow 
will be used. The hot money flow is the short term capital flows, short term bank credits and portfolio 
investments that enters into the economy in a certain period of time. Thus, since it would be not proper 
to limit the financial liberalization with a single indicator, the real interest rates and credit growth from 
Kaminsky vd. (1998), Williamson and Mahar (2002) studies, would also be used as other indicators of 
financial liberalization. 
Regarding our study’s purpose, the most suitable econometric method is the VAR model in which the 
cause and effect functions and causal relationships are designated. To this end, in order to determine 
the effect of financial liberalization on pre-crisis indicators, the time series analysis will be performed 
with the three month period data between the years of 1991 and 2014. In this context, for the Turkish 
economy, time series effect of pre-crisis indicators after year of 1989 (the year which Turkish economy 
completed the financial liberalization) will be analyzed.  
In addition, in order to examine the causal relationship, Toda-Yamamoto test will be used. The data 
will be collected from the web sites of Turkish Centeral Bank, Turkish Statistical Institute, Ministry of 
Development and International Financial Statistics. In analysis Eviews 8.0 Computer programme will 
be used. The year 1989 is chosen since it is the year that the restrictions on capital movement been 
removed and by that the final stage, the financial liberalization been realized. However, because of the 
absence of database in Turkish Centeral Bank and International Financial Statistics web sites, under the 
econometric analysis, the timeline starts in the fourth quarter of 1991 and finishes in the second quarter 
of year 2014. 
Our study’s purpose is to be able to make a political analysis by examining the interaction between the 
pre-crisis indicators and financial liberalization and the shocks. The VAR model is suitable since it is 
widely used in crisis economy and the our purpose is political analysis. The shocks in the variables and 
their effects on other variables are measured. Since we are interested in shocks, the equality of stability 
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levels of variables is not at importance (Enders, 1995). In order to see the shocks clearly and to prevent 
the series to loose their own qualities, it is important to provide stabilization (Sevüktekin & 
Nargeleçekenler, 2010). 
However, in econometric models; if the time periods are long, structural breaks occur in the model 
arising out of the crisis, policy changes, political problems that occurred during that period. To test the 
stability of the variables in our study, we will use Zivot-Andrews Test which designates the structural 
breaks of variables internally (Zivot & Andrews, 2002). In addition, the reason we use 
Toda-Yamamoto Test is the use of level values of the series and they are not sensitive to the unit root 
unification qualities (Lütkepohl & Kratzig, 2004). In summary, the econometric model that will be 
used are; “Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test”, “VAR Model” and “Toda-Yamamoto Causality Test”.  
 
4. The Econometric Findings 
Before the analysis with the VAR model, the time series of variables been transferred into logarithmic 
form. However, since the “cab”, “dbc”, “hmm”, “open” and “rir” variables became negative in some 
periods, their logarithmic transformation has not been performed. In the following phase, the 
Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test has been applied to determine whether the variables are stable or not.  
 
Table 2. Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test 
The Variables Break in Intercept Break in Trend Break in Trend and Intercept 
Industrial Production Index (ipi) -4.161204 (2003Q3) -3.824282 (2001Q3) -4.287675 (2003Q3) 
Current Account Balance (cab) -4.837518 (2010Q3) -5.393278 (2002Q1) -5.459620 (2001Q1) 
International Reserve (irz) -3.087495 (2004Q4) -2.185676 (2008Q2) -3.466241 (2005Q4) 
Hot Money Movement (hmm) -5.071076 (2010Q1) -4.047595 (2001Q2) -5.207956 (2010Q1) 
The Foreign Trade Deficit (open) -4.786335 (2010Q3) -4.852872 (2002Q3) -5.144399 (2001Q1) 
Credit Growth (dbc)  -4.096806 (1998Q3) -3.381810 (2002Q1) -4.357079 (1998Q3) 
M2 Money Supply (m2)  -4.570300 (2005Q1) -2.328930 (2010Q4) -3.885659 (2005Q4) 
The Foreign Currency Exchange (e)  -2.551592 (1995Q4) -4.860742 (2001Q3) -4.633020 (2001Q1) 
Foreign Debt Volume (fd) -4.539204 (2006Q1) -3.384930 (1997Q2) -4.435346 (2006Q1) 
Real Interest Rate (rir) -8.738814 (200Q4) -7.217481 (2001Q2)  -8.686311 (200Q4) 
 
According to Table 2 results, in the model that includes the stability and trend on the 5% sematic level 
“cab”, “hmm”, “open” and “rir” variables level values are high so they are stable. The other variables 
become stable in the first difference. In the VAR model, after the determining whether the variables are 
stable or not, the proper time lag is found. According to the results the convenient time lag is 7. 
However, in this time lag, varying variation and auto-corrolation problems have been encountered. The 
time lag that these problems do not exist is 2. In the phase after, the characteristic roots been examined 
to define whether the VAR (2) model is consistent or not. According to findings, VAR (2) model is 
consistent and stable since all the roots are within the unit circle.  
In Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3, the pre-crisis indicators reactions to the shocks of financial 
liberalization indicators of hot money movement, credit growth and real interest rates can been seen. In 
order to determine how these shocks occure; their movement analyzed in 10 terms. The reactions of the 
financial liberalization indicators to shocks, generalized in 1 percent standard error deviation been 
analyzed and laid out in the Figures.  
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The results of the VAR (2) model cause and effect functions demonstrate; the effect of financial 
liberalization indicators on the pre-crisis indicators (either positively or negatively), which of the 
financial liberalization indicators cause the most permanent affect and in crisis economy which of the 
financial liberalization indicators should be considered as a policy tool. 
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Figure 1. The Reaction of Pre-Crisis Indicators to Shocks That Are Generalized One Standard 
Deviated Hot Money Movement (± 2 S.E.) 
 
In Figure 1, it can be seen that the reaction of “cab” and “open” to “hmm” is almost same and negative 
during 10 periods. The negative effect continues during all of the period. The reaction of “e” to “hmm” 
is negative at the beginning but, this effect is lost in the second period as similar to the other current 
balance pre-crisis indicators (cab and open). If we look at the reactions of the foreign debt, the capital 
account, the real sector and other financial pre-indicators to “hmm”; from fifth period to tenth period 
the shocks occurring in “hmm” affects the “ipe” negatively and cause it to decrease. The positive 
reaction given by “fd” and “m2” in the beginning becomes negative after the completion of five period 
and this effect continues until the tenth period. No important increase or decrease is seen in the 
variables of “ipe”, “m2” and “fd” following the negative effect occurring during five periods.  
The capital account pre-crisis indicator “irz” is in the beginning reacts positively to “hmm” however, 
after in the second period, the reaction becomes negative. On the third period, the reaction of “irz” 
returns to its old situation. In the fifth period, its reaction lose its effect. 
In Figure 2 it can be seen that the reaction of “cab” and open to “dbc” is negative in the first period and 
do not encounter any important increase and decrease during the 10 periods. The reaction of “e” (the 
other pre-crisis indicator) to “hmm” is positive in the first period and it continues as positive during the 
ten following periods. 
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Figure 2. The Reaction of Pre-Crisis Indicators to Shocks That Are Generalized One Standard 
Deviated Credit Growth (± 2 S.E.) 
 
In Figure 2, the reaction of pre-crisis indicator of reel sector “ipe” to “dbc” is positive at the beginning 
but after an increasing and decreasing reaction during seven periods, a negative effect occurs. The 
financial variable pre-crisis indicator “m2” reacts to “dbc” negatively in the first two periods. This 
positive effect in the third and fourth periods changes into negative in the fifth period. The capital 
account pre-crisis indicator “irz” reacts negatively in the first two periods however after that period an 
increasing and decreasing reaction occurs. This reaction ends with a negative effect on the tenth period. 
The “fd” reacts negatively in the first two periods to “dbc” after that, its increasing and decreasing 
reaction in the third and fourth periods, loses its effect. 
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Figure 3. The Reaction of Pre-Crisis Indicators to Shocks That Are Generalized One Standard 
Deviated Real Interest Rates (± 2 S.E.) 
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In Figure 3, the reaction of “cab” and “open” to shocks that occur in “rir” is positive at the beginning. 
This positive effect continues for eight periods for “cab” and continues for nine periods for “open” and 
after it returns to negative. The reaction of “e” is positive in the first period. This positive affect is lost 
in the fourth period and returns to its status at the begining at the nineth period. The reaction of 
pre-crisis indicator of reel sector “ipe” to “rir” is negative at the first three periods and together with the 
fourth period, it turns into positive and after it loses its effect. While the first effect of “rir” shocks to 
“m2” and “fd” is positive, it loses its effect after ten periods. As similar, first effect of “rir” to “irz” is 
negative but it loses its effect after some time. Pre-crisis indicator capital account “irz” reacts 
negatively to real interest rate in the first five and last two periods. 
Variance separation results are presented to display the percentage effect of the financial liberalization 
and other pre-crisis indicators in total change in pre-crisis indicators and to lay out the relation of them. 
When Appendix 1 is examined, it can be seen that the change in the current account balance (cab) 
variance occurred mostly by (in order) hot money movements (hmm), foreign trade deficit (open), the 
foreign currency exchange rate (e) and the real interests (rir). If we interpret this result in causality, the 
reasons of change in the current account balance are hot money movements, foreign trade deficit, the 
foreign currency exchange rate and the real interests. In Appendix 2, the most effective indicator on the 
foreign currency exchange rate (other then itself) after ten periods is the financial variable pre-crisis 
indicator “money supply (m2)”. The most effective variables on foreign currency exchange rate other 
then itself and money supply (m2) are (in order); real interest rates (rir), international reserves (irz) and 
credit growth (dbc). The reason of change in the foreign currency exchange rate is in order, money 
supply, real interest rates international reserves and credit growth. 
Appendix 3 presents that the foreign debt (fd), following itself, is mostly effected by (in order), foreign 
trade deficit (open), real interest rates (rir), money supply (m2) and credit growth. The indicators that 
mostly affected the change in the foreign debt are; foreign trade deficit, real interest rates and credit 
growth. In Appendix 4, according to the variance separation results of industrial production index 
variance, the industrial production index following itself mostly effected by real interest rates (rir), 
money supply (m2), international reserves (irz) foreign currency exchange and foreign trade deficit, in 
the last period.  
The industrial production index is mostly affected by the real interest rates. In Appendix 5, the 
international reserves are explained mostly by (other than itself) the real interest rates, hot money 
movement, credit growth and foreign trade. 
Appendix 6 presents that the change in the money supply variance, following itself, is mostly effected 
(in order), real interest rates, credit growth, current balance account, foreign trade deficit and hot 
money movement at the end of ten periods. The most effective indicators to the change in the foreign 
debt are; foreign trade deficit, real interest rates and credit growth. 
The changes in foreign trade deficit (open) variance explained mostly by-following itself—(in order) 
hot money movement, real interest rates, foreign currency exchange rate, industrial production index 
and credit growth in Appendix 7. Based on the causal relationship, the reasons of changes in foreign 
trade deficit are (in order); the hot money movement, real interest rates, foreign currency exchange rate, 
the industrial production index and credit growth. 
In our study, we have used Toda-Yamamoto causality test to determine the reasonability relations 
between the financial liberalization and pre-crisis indicators. As the first phase of Toda-Yamamoto 
causality test procedure, we have created the standard VAR models by using the levels in the variances. 
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During the creation of VAR model for Toda-Yamamoto causality test, while selecting the proper time 
lag, it can be seen that 7 is the most proper one among the criterias.  
We have encountered several problems of aforementioned changing time lags variance and 
autocorrolation. The time lags that do not have these problems is time-lag period 2. Hence, we 
established the VAR model for time lag period 2 (k=2).  
The standart VAR model for time lag period 2 (k=2) has been designated for the first phase of 
Toda-Yamamoto causality test. In the second phase; based on the Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test 
results, the maximum unification of variances “dmax” has been designated as 1. This value is smaller 
than the VAR models’ real degree of 2. 
Following, by artificially adding maximum unification degree to the VAR model degree, the VAR 
models’ degree increased to 3 (by 2+1=3). Autocorrelation problem occured in the guessed VAR (3) 
model. While applying the Toda-Yamamoto method, the autocorrolation and/or variation number could 
be corrected by “Newey-West” model so, to overcome the autocorrelation problem, the time lag 
number has not been changed. In next phase, the dependent variable of regression models of the 
pre-crisis indicators in VAR (3) model has been guessed and with “Newey-West” Method the 
autocorrelation problem has been solved. In addition, while implementing the causality test the 
restriction has been implemented on the first 2 parameters (k=2). 
The results of Toda-Yamamoto Causality Test of the cause and effect relationship of chosen financial 
liberalization indicators and pre-crisis indicators are presented in Table 3. If the calculated statistics is 
higher than the Chi-Square or the probability value is smaller than significance level, then there is 
causal relationship. According to Table 3, the financial liberalization indicators which are the current 
account balance, industrial production index and international reserves, do not have any direct causal 
relationship with pre-crisis indicators. 
On the other hand, the financial liberalization indicator of hot money movement in the significance 
level of 0.10 can cause the foreign trade deficit with pre-crisis indicator current account balance. There 
is also causal relationship between the financial liberalization indicator real interest rate and current 
balance account pre-crisis indicator the foreign currency exchange rate in significance level of 0.10. 
The Table 3 presents the financial liberalization indicators of real interest rates and credit growth that cause 
the pre-crisis indicator of the money supply. These two financial liberalization indicators causes the money 
supply in 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels. In addition, the real interest rates causes foreign debt in 0.01 and 
0.05 significance levels. 
Looking at the causal relationship of pre-crisis indicators, the outstanding indicator is the international 
reserve. According to Table 3 there is direct causal relationship of the international reserve with foreign 
trade deficit, current account balance, foreign currency exchange rate and industrial production index.  
 
Table 3. The Toda-Yamamoto Causality Test Results of Financial Liberalization and Other 
Pre-Crisis Indicators 
Zero Hypothesis Test Statistics The Value Degree of Freedom Probability  
No causality from irz to ipe K-Square  6.278 2 0.0433 
No causality from irz to cab K-Square 4.633 2 0.0986 
No causality from irz to open K-Square 6.625 2 0.0364 
No causality from cab to open K-Square 4.953 2 0.0840 
No causality from ipe to open K-Square 4.741 2 0.0934 
No causality from hmm to open K-Square 4.997 2 0.0822 
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No causality from rir to e K-Square 5.637 2 0.0597 
No causality from M2 to e K-Square 17.927 2 0.0001 
No causality from dbc to M2 K-Square 7.418 2 0.0245 
No causality from rir to M2 K-Square 7.749 2 0.0208 
No causality from rir to fd K-Square 6.115 2 0.0470 
No causality from ipe to fd K-Square 7.270 2 0.0264 
 
5. The Conclusion and the Discussion 
The VAR (2) model in our study asses that; based on the results of the cause and effect functions, the hot 
money flow and the credit growth are the financial liberalization indicators that negatively affect the current 
account balance and foreign trade deficit. According to the variance separation study, the effect of hot 
money movement is higher than the credit growth and real interest rates. In the Toda Yamamoto Causality 
Test it has been designated that the hot money movement has direct causal relationship with foreign trade 
deficit.  
Based on these results, the hot money flows are the most effective financial liberalization indicator that 
triggers economic and financial crisis by affecting the pre-crisis indicators of current account balance and 
foreign trade deficit.  
This result reveals that the decision making mechanism in Turkish economy crisis management should 
consider hot money flow as a policy tool. The results of VAR (2) model cause and effect functions and 
variance separation; the negative effect of the real interest rates (as a financial liberalization indicator) 
on the pre-crisis indicators of foreign currency exchange rate, international reserves, foreign debt and 
money supply is more than the effect of hot money flow and credit growth as an explanation of these 
indicators as percentage. 
Considering the ten periods, the real interest rates have more of increasing effect in money supply and 
foreign debt and reducing effect in foreign currency exchange rate and international reserves. This 
consequence is also supported by the results of the Toda Yamamoto Causality Test which states that 
there is a direct causal effect from interest rates, to the foreign currency exchange rate, money supply 
and foreign debt.  
According to the Toda Yamamoto Causality Test that performed in our study; there is no causality 
relationship between the financial liberalization indicators and the pre-crisis indicator “industrial 
production index”.  
The results in VAR (2) model reveal that; the real sector pre-crisis indicator industrial production index 
is more effected by the financial liberalization indicator of hot money flow. Also the beginning positive 
effect of real interest rates on industrial production index is lost by the elapse of time. The credit 
growth has an up and down effect. According to the cause and effect functions, the financial 
liberalization indicators affect the real sector negatively on industrial index. While the hot money 
movement creates the most negative effect in the cause and effect functions, the result of variance 
separation reveal that; the most effective variance on production index is real interest rates. Although; 
the real interest rates are the most explanatory indicator of industrial production index, in the cause and 
effect functions the positive effect of real interest rates on industrial production index transform into 
negative by the elapse of time. 
As a result, the econometric analysis in our study reveals that the chosen three financial liberalization 
indicators effects the pre-crisis indicators mostly negatively and causes the economy to drag into a dead 
end. The hot money movement the real interest rates and the changes in credit growth are the indicators 
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that increase the vulnerability and possibility of crisis in Turkish economy. According to the results of 
VAR (2) model cause and effect, variance separation and the results of Toda Yamamoto Causality Test; 
the negative effect of financial liberalization indicators of hot money movement and real interest rates 
on pre-crisis indicators and their explanation percentage and causal relationship is higher than the effect 
of credit growth.  
If we analyze the pre-crisis indicators effects on each other, their explanatory percentage and casual 
relationships, the prominent indicators are; the variable pre-crisis indicator the money supply and 
capital account and the other pre-crisis indicator international reserve are the ones that outsand.  
These results reveal that the real interest rates, the hot money movement which consists the major part 
of capital movement, the money supply (the indicator of financial liberalization) and the international 
reserves are more effective on the financial and economic crisis in Turkish economy after the year of 
1989, the year which the capital movement in economy is liberalized. 
It can be seen that the problem in Turkish economy is more related to the financial liberalization and 
capital account. In addition, the decision makers in Turkish economic crisis management should more 
gravitate on hot money movements, real interest rates, money supply and international reserves for 
tools of policy and propose alternative policy tools. 
In addition, according to the results of VAR (2) models, compared with the other financial 
liberalization indicators, since the credit growth effects the pre-crisis indicators more positively, it 
would be more proper for the Turkish policy makers to create policies to prevent the probable negative 
effects of increasing hot money movement and real interest rates.  
Together with financial liberalization, the abolition of restrictions on the movement of capital, foreign 
currency exchange and interest rate, the increasing tendency towards foreign currency occurred. This 
increasing tendency towards foreign currency causes serious problems in Turkish economy.  
When the liquidity benchmark money supply is high, it is a sign that the monetary obligations are 
increasing and financial system is defenseless to the probable shocks. In addition to the increasing 
monetary obligations, the insufficient level of international reserves increases the financial 
vulnerability. In the environment of uncertainity and risk, the investors or the depositors want to 
exchange their financial assets to foreign currency. For that kind of situation and the shocks of that sort, 
the Turkish economy should have a policy to keep and collect necessary level of reserves. As a policy 
tool the international reserve is an important indicator in prevention of financial crisis such as; crisis of 
foreign currency.  
The foreign capital movement is a financial indicator which positively effects the increasing real 
interests in Turkey. The foreign capital enter to the Turkish economy with high interest rate and low 
exchange rate expectation and the most part of it consists of hot money movement. However, the crisis 
in Turkey occurs when this foreign capital leaves the economy. Thus, in order to reduce the real 
interest rates to increase the investments and economic activity, there should be an environment 
without uncertainity, risk and unstability.  
From the year 2002 to year 2008 the low interest rates in Turkey increased the investments. However, 
the level of investment that has been reached was as the levels reached before. The savings were not 
enough both in the past and the mentioned 2002-2008 period. Hence, the political tool of deciding on 
raising or reducing the interest rates depends on some other conditions. First of all, in order to decrease 
the dependence on foreign capital, policies should be implemented to increase domestic savings and 
production. 
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The savings should be increased; by performing public spending to increase the national income and 
employment or by promoting the foreign investment to directly invest to the country. In addition, since 
the direct foreign investment supports the savings needed for the economic growth, share of the direct 
foreign investment in the capital movement should be increased. The banking sector should also be 
more careful in providing credits and to support that end, the mutual share of information should be 
effective. 
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Appendix 1 
Variance Decomposition of Current Account Balance 
 
Appendix 2 
Variance Decomposition of Foreign Currency Exchange 
 Period CAB DBC E  FD HMM IPE IRZ M2 OPEN RIR 
 1  0.000000  1.893621  61.35635  0.000000  2.894713  0.000000  0.000000  32.76767  0.000000  1.087647 
 2  3.684672  8.807770  36.00982  0.062457  1.830161  0.311583  10.24048  24.15618  1.408599  13.48829 
 3  3.562775  7.884034  32.17457  0.058167  2.602076  0.552344  9.186559  22.61201  5.511162  15.85631 
 4  4.044507  7.798237  31.44671  0.059011  2.845442  0.539426  9.036985  22.28463  6.346229  15.59883 
 5  3.916756  7.551242  30.71790  0.113892  3.533053  0.756766  8.784273  21.59388  6.686430  16.34580 
 6  3.827292  7.428694  29.93585  0.144568  4.135572  0.864479  8.659880  21.17728  6.621975  17.20442 
 7  3.777068  7.528846  29.52514  0.167819  4.665210  0.976155  8.562497  20.89077  6.563888  17.34260 
 8  3.746030  7.581714  29.31182  0.201428  5.120447  1.024400  8.517682  20.73435  6.520313  17.24182 
 9  3.729063  7.601289  29.17421  0.246294  5.394714  1.047637  8.526090  20.64621  6.484332  17.15015 
 10  3.717922  7.622676  29.08010  0.296441  5.554269  1.052745  8.536882  20.60044  6.455544  17.08298 
 
 
 
 
Period CAB DBC E FD HMM IPE IRZ M2 OPEN RIR 
1 40.06341 0.682282 .892277 0.000000 4.689231  0.000000 0.000000 2.448171 46.28467 0.939959 
2 29.32833 0.399290 4.133013 0.609385  11.04836  1.544410  1.887683  4.038587  40.95284  6.058098 
3 22.76968 0.460799  5.850924 0.464032  15.60374  4.480928  1.759073  4.560123  36.69308  7.357623 
4 18.97088 1.853873  7.100258 0.949349  20.03173  5.941941  1.486900  4.118248  32.52031  7.026511 
5 17.20932 3.019113  7.595843 1.840335  23.17893  6.239586  1.314744  3.641402  29.16109  6.799634 
6 16.27032 3.311416  7.812684 2.525798  25.02818  6.275120  1.378634  3.488779  27.22679  6.682290 
7 15.56517  3.470036  7.971684 2.973156  25.81864  6.216913  1.754111  3.715388  26.07450  6.440409 
8 15.09976  3.741900  8.032453 3.242323  26.07595  6.083937  2.015756  4.180905  25.29426  6.232745 
9 14.82709  3.896084  8.032434 3.383016  26.14619  5.978126  2.148821  4.544326  24.91359  6.130326 
10 14.69795  3.909251  8.019727 3.438224  26.11756  5.925907  2.276360  4.749858  24.76823  6.096921 
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Appendix 3 
Variance Decomposition of Foreign Debt 
 Period CAB DBC E FD HMM  IPE IRZ M2 OPEN RIR 
 1  2.059560  8.129868  2.909079  69.98879  0.813265  0.000000  0.000000  0.965218  14.35408  0.780141 
 2  1.951591  7.250463  2.544833  60.38677  0.707878  1.202381  2.755122  3.824682  12.35552  7.020756 
 3  1.727994  6.543444  4.246580  54.73469  0.625242  3.116636  3.721550  6.389888  10.92157  7.972409 
 4  1.871125  6.555523  4.189243  54.13361  0.768393  3.072568  4.042444  6.542383  10.79166  8.033054 
 5  1.995042  6.498540  4.157397  53.52507  0.776118  3.057926  4.248333  6.704246  11.06271  7.974616 
 6  2.015777  6.457227  4.192569  53.22915  0.771477  3.038720  4.282497  6.883221  11.12604  8.003330 
 7  2.038402  6.427451  4.173102  52.99383  0.800828  3.044110  4.280508  6.913221  11.18855  8.139996 
 8  2.031627  6.406140  4.160142  52.81818  0.850629  3.060261  4.290598  6.964943  11.19790  8.219584 
 9  2.029252  6.412649  4.155361  52.74072  0.910095  3.080474  4.284177  6.961651  11.19929  8.226327 
 10  2.027123  6.426805  4.156451  52.68458  0.972675  3.088106  4.279038  6.953176  11.19086  8.221181 
 
Appendix 4 
Variance Decomposition of Industrial Production Index 
 Period CAB DBC E FD HMM IPE IRZ M2 OPEN RIR 
 1  0.312281  3.190502  12.47814  0.001938  1.153763  57.47307  1.898213  12.45949  4.210880  6.821730 
 2  0.716972  2.431237  9.664782  0.936624  4.356449  43.81490  8.213112  11.24349  3.201529  15.42090 
 3  3.724057  3.276285  9.632033  2.400376  4.041079  38.82183  8.831379  9.628374  6.072962  13.57162 
 4  3.895960  3.295202  9.413578  2.406550  4.101120  37.81245  9.061315  10.46355  6.138780  13.41150 
 5  4.309904  3.164681  9.096900  2.353127  4.023941  36.08626  9.207238  10.57912  6.677303  14.50152 
 6  4.323924  3.201959  8.868343  2.318525  3.975874  35.26295  9.154979  11.00050  6.664431  15.22851 
 7  4.309785  3.211958  8.822918  2.305568  4.105704  35.20031  9.095849  10.95253  6.746279  15.24910 
 8  4.282584  3.336667  8.813879  2.315897  4.352520  35.05842  9.047836  10.88363  6.750612  15.15796 
 9  4.295870  3.367432  8.802547  2.350767  4.518819  34.96208  9.017525  10.84810  6.729712  15.10714 
 10  4.291326  3.364198  8.805283  2.383398  4.596952  34.90164  9.031919  10.83122  6.717224  15.07684 
 
Appendix 5 
Variance Decomposition of International Reserves 
Period CAB DBC  E FD HMM IPE IRZ M2 OPEN RIR 
 1  1.030158  8.082284  1.548337  7.399184  8.128471  0.000000  52.64056  10.13127  0.086509  10.95323 
 2  1.278036  7.529385  1.771821  7.067837  8.398905  0.183853  48.26112  10.53384  3.210389  11.76482 
 3  2.195890  7.046332  3.243687  7.648012  7.978292  1.025049  45.95417  9.871966  3.005483  12.03112 
 4  2.174726  7.267702  3.237460  7.565293  7.919921  1.144969  46.01511  9.742896  2.995544  11.93638 
 5  2.469018  7.202175  3.423852  7.463640  7.809444  1.128914  45.48214  10.03628  3.214062  11.77048 
 6  2.512822  7.348363  3.414226  7.426122  7.791420  1.136885  45.33972  9.984015  3.244320  11.80211 
 7  2.657416  7.310427  3.399584  7.388076  7.777929  1.132300  45.17835  9.963878  3.233012  11.95903 
 8  2.654227  7.347181  3.397349  7.377778  7.770340  1.142648  45.12080  9.986586  3.228926  11.97417 
 9  2.684836  7.350291  3.400188  7.369930  7.773450  1.154011  45.08684  9.981818  3.231948  11.96669 
 10  2.682059  7.388497  3.403015  7.368890  7.795797  1.155562  45.04346  9.977727  3.229462  11.95553 
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Appendix 6 
Variance Decomposition of M2 
Period CAB DBC E FD HMM IPE IRZ M2 OPEN RIR 
 1  0.000000  1.184043  0.000000  0.000000  2.432568  0.000000  0.000000  96.18998  0.000000  0.193410 
 2  0.780403  7.538978  1.587971  0.206990  2.199127  0.387857  0.751907  81.58723  0.037412  4.922126 
 3  4.949735  7.779185  1.349470  0.295674  1.837880  0.850698  0.783256  68.65924  3.330318  10.16455 
 4  5.356926  7.544200  1.404087  0.299748  1.782549  0.899343  1.009706  66.47248  4.113670  11.11729 
 5  5.217626  7.339732  2.488635  0.381116  2.007801  1.094292  1.416270  64.52262  4.574224  10.95768 
 6  5.212261  7.227822  2.591319  0.443478  2.260817  1.160792  1.729241  63.32248  4.515227  11.53656 
 7  5.331604  7.170719  2.601667  0.465752  2.401071  1.215592  1.719425  62.78398  4.481339  11.82886 
 8  5.313285  7.157696  2.623548  0.479650  2.545385  1.261174  1.744454  62.57713  4.466902  11.83078 
 9  5.303887  7.188243  2.644810  0.500054  2.657334  1.280668  1.758579  62.41145  4.452036  11.80294 
 10  5.291080  7.208110  2.662992  0.526274  2.727736  1.281131  1.766461  62.29183  4.443717  11.80067 
 
Appendix 7 
Variance Decomposition of Foreign Trade Deficit 
 Period CAB DBC E FD HMM IPE IRZ M2 OPEN RIR 
 1  0.000000  1.062487  8.892972  0.000000  5.305903  0.000000  0.000000  5.343595  79.24142  0.153620 
 2  3.632950  2.196533  5.446142  0.606064  15.01180  1.093084  1.545193  4.608591  61.06381  4.795837 
 3  5.391420  2.407078  4.531338  0.471853  18.92849  2.645830  2.650418  5.763932  47.85327  9.356364 
 4  4.736905  2.311101  4.961676  0.606989  22.79758  4.552697  2.168164  5.711299  41.28809  10.86549 
 5  4.163360  3.087983  5.614080  1.241734  25.96377  5.441787  1.954712  5.079335  37.06809  10.38514 
 6  3.819655  4.223164  5.902318  1.983362  28.19320  5.635030  1.872156  4.786828  33.83556  9.748729 
 7  3.651983  4.594165  6.085068  2.547802  29.39950  5.566628  1.973284  4.802529  32.04019  9.338855 
 8  3.535412  4.679767  6.169468  2.886109  29.79902  5.468720  2.336189  5.037940  31.05005  9.037319 
 9  3.495868  4.796626  6.219729  3.066058  29.80911  5.363344  2.603952  5.417718  30.39353  8.834072 
 10  3.466066  4.887007  6.231490  3.151515  29.76415  5.293618  2.708170  5.707552  30.06038  8.730051 
 
 
